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Commentary
Kevin D. Hoover
joint and not independent. But ifwe keep
these restrictions in mind, we can still use the
lS-LM model to understand what some of
the issues are.
cc Ohanian and Alan Stockman’s paper
presents a careful, lucid surveyof aseries of
lblawtechnicallydifficult models of the liquidity
effect. Iwould like first to clarifyfor the reader
(exactly as Ihad to do formyself) whatseem to
me to be the key issues and conclusions of
their survey and then to offer an assessment
(not of their admirable paper, but) of the
research program on which it reports.
In years, I am somewhat younger than
Alan Stockman and slightly older than Lee
Ohanian. In training, however, I amcom-
pletely antediluvian. I will therefore attempt
to clarify the issues using, for the most part,
the venerable (and much maligned) IS-LM
model. Ohanian and Stockman begin their
analysis of the liquidity effectwith an lS-LM
model. But they treat it as ifit werejust
another model on par with the sequence of
micro-foundational models that they explore
through the rest ofthe paper. Actually the
IS-LM model operates on a differentplane
from the other models. It displays the rela-
tionships among aggregates with only the
most implicit commitment to particular
micro-foundations. Therefore, each of
Ohanian and Stockman’s models can be seen
as attempts to fill in the details that lie behind
the IS-LM-AS (aggregate supply) analysis,
rather than as substitutes for that analysis.
Thus, consider, for example, their first model:
the sticky-price model. Cast as a dynamic
optimization model for a representative agent,
it canbe seen as particularizing the IS-LM
model: It treats the consumption function as
a life-cycle or permanent-income type; the
investment function as the most rudimentary
neoclassical type; money demand as governed
by the quantity theory; and labor supply as
derived from utility maximization; and, most
important of all, it insists that these functions
and the decisions that lie behind them are
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Consider the canonical (classical)
lS-LM-AS in Figure 1. The aggregate supply
curve is vertical, indicating market clearing
in labor and product markets. Ifthe money
supply increases by AM, the LM curve shifts
to the right, and equivalently the AD(aggre-
gate demand) curve shifts upward. At the
original price level, p, aggregate demand
exceeds aggregate supply Ifsuch asituation
is technically infeasible, then prices must rise
fromp to p’, which shifts the LM curveback to
its original position, since the location of the
LM curve depends on the real money supply
Mip. Interest rates remainunchanged. This
is the flexible price case.
Now, if, in the short-run aggregate
supply can exceed its long-run level at AS
(which might be, as Ohanian andStockman
observe, a result of the assumption of
monopolistic competition) and if prices are
sticky, say at p, then output rises and interest
rates fall from ito i’. This is the liquidity
effect: An expansion of money results in afall
in interest rates. It is a fall in the nominal
interest rate and,because prices are sticky in
the real interestrate as well.
Ifincreases in the money supply are not
simply lump-sum, but are this period’s real-
ization of higher growth rates of money asso-
ciated with increasing rates of inflation, then
there is another efl’ect to consider. Investment
is afunction of cx ante (or anticipated) real
rates, not of nominal rates ofinterest. As
anticipated rates of inflation increase, a con-
stant cx ante real interest rate must be repre-
sented by higher nominal rates of interest.
Thus, as the rate of inflation increases in
Figure 2b y4, the IS curve mustshift verti-
callyby4 in order for each level of GNP to
correspond to the correct real interest rate.C
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If prices are sticky at p, then the nominal
interest rate rises by less than the increase in
inflation to 1’: Anticipated inflation stimulates
output, investment and (short-run) gro\vth.’
Real rates therefore fall. This is the Mundell-
Tobin effect.’ If, however, prices are flexible,
prices rise until aggregate demand equals
aggregate supply (from p top’), shifting the
LM curve back and increasing interest rates
from ito i”. Here, the nominal interest rate
fully reflects the increased rate ofinflation.
This is the Fisher effect: An increase in infla-
tion corresponds to a one-for-one increase in
nominal interest rates.4
There can also be aMundell-Tobin effect
with flexible prices. Ifconsumption depends
not only on GNP but also on the real value
ofnominally denominated wealth (bonds or
money), then, as in Figure 3, there are two
effects: First, the upwardshift of the IS curve
by the full amount of the anticipated inflation
and, second, a partly offsetting downward
shift ofthe IS curve o\ving to rising prices
thatreduce real wealth in the consumption
function.” The LM curve has to shift less far
back to restore equality between aggregate
demand and supply so that interest rates rise
from ito i’, which is less than the increase in
inflation. Real rates ofinterest therefore fall.
Because of the full employment assumption,
current output is unchanged, hut investment
rises (and consumption falls) asa result of
lower real rates of interest, which increases
the rate ofGNP growth.
Therefore, we havethree effects: a hquidity
effect; a Fisher effect; and a Mundell-Tohin
effect. These constitute a powerful taxonomy
and—I think—one that is clearer than that
used by Ohanian andStockman, Ohanian
and Stockman define a liquidity effect to be
the systemic change in an interest rate as the
result ofa monetary expansion. They distin-
guish between a real and anominal liquidity
effect. Ithink that it would better to reserve
the term liquidity effect only for those changes
in the real rate of interest induced directly by
money expansion. The only interesting hquid-
ity effects are real because, without a change
in the real rate of interest, there can be no
accompanying effect on any other real vari-
ables that interest us: GNP; investment; con-







recognize is that liquidity effects are often
(and depending upon the model, often nec-
essarily) accompanied by the other two effects.
The systemic effect is the sum of several par-
tial effects.
THE tD~DEI~S
Ohanian and Stockman consider a series
ofmodels, I-low do these effects play out in
each of them?
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Soene of the key features of this model
were already described above. One addition-
al feature is that money is modeled using the
cash-in-advance constraint. In the IS-LM
model, this means that the LM is vertical at a
level of GNP determined by the real supply
of money (Figure 4). The increase in money
(the shifi of T.M no the right) has the usual
liquidity effect, ceteris parihus, reducing the
interest rate. In this model, we can under-
stand that effect as arising from an increase
in current consumption because of the relax-
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ation of the cash-in-advance constraint.
Optimally agents want to consume more in
future periods as well (an implication of the
life-cycle/permanent-income hypothesis) and
so increase capital accumulation today low-
ering the rate of return on capital and the real
rate of interest. (Notice that the liquidity
effect here has nothing whatsoever to do with
the interest elasticity ofthe demand for money;
it works the same whether the LM curve is
vertical or sianply upward sloping.)6
Prices are pre-determined in the current
period in this model. They can, however,
adjust in the future. Thus, an unexpected
increase in money this period is associatedwith
perfectly anticipated inflation. Consequently
the IS curve shifts up at the same time that
the LM curve shifts out. There are two cases.
In Figure 4a, the liquidity effect outweighs
the inflation efi’ecc, and both real and nomi-
nal interest rates fall. In Figure 4b, the infla-
tion effect outweighs the liquidity effect, and
nominal interests rates rise, although since
is less than i”, real interest rates fall. As
Ohanian and Stockman observe, which case
one obtains depends on the degree of relative
risk aversion (or equivalently on the degree
of intertemporal substitution between con-
sumption today and tomorrow). Yet, either
way the real rate falls, which is the important
point about the liquidity effect. Christiano
(1991) usefully distinguishes betweena dom-
inant liquidity effect (Figure 4a) and a non-
dominant liquidity effect (or dominant infla-
tion effecting, as shown in Figure 4b).
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In the otnodel with perfectly flexible
prices, there is no anticipated inflation effect,
because the price level jumps immediately to
bring aggregate supply and demand back into
equality Ifsome prices are flexible this period,
fewer prices will have to adjust in future
periods. Therefore, while there will be an
anticipated inflation effect, it will be smaller
than in the model with all prices sticky It is
therefore in this case less likely that theinfla-
tion effectwill dominate as in Figure 4b, and
more hkelythat both nominal and real interest
rates will fall. Ohanian and Stockman’s con-
tribution with respect to this model is to show
that for reasonable parameterizations only
smafi degrees ofprice stickiness are enough
to produce dominant liquidity efi’ecus,
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The possibility ofHicks-neutral technol-
ogy shocks and capital accumulation intro-
duces two new effects into the analysis. A
technology shock can be represented as in
Figure 5 asshifting the AS curve to the right.
Ifprices were perfectly flexible, they would
fall immediately (without anticipated infla-
tion) from pt op’, shifting the LM curve
right and lowering the interest rate to i”.
This is the pure technology-shock effect. If
prices are not perfectly flexible, however,
there will be anticipated deflation, and the IS
curve will also shift down, so that the final
equilibrium interest rate is i”. This fall in the
nominal rate is greater than the pure Fisher
effect (i—i”) so that the real rate falls.
Unlike a neutral technology shock, capi-
tal accumulation, ceteris paribus, not only
shifts the AS curve to the right, it also
reduces the marginal product of capital,
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mists talk us if on interest-elastic
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becnuse them isa liquidity effect in
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which can be represented by a downward
shift of the IS curve. This would simply
magnify the drop in interest rates (real and
nominal) in Figure 5. The interesting ques-
tion, which can be answered in Ohanian and
Stockman’s parameterized model, but not in
this qualitative model, is what the typical
time-series behavior of interest rates would
be given repetitive shocks to both money
and technology in the face of capital accu-
mulation.
The Increosuw-RetijrrTs Mode!
The increasing-returns model is much
more difficult to cast in an IS-LM-AS frame-
work, although it couldno doubt be done
with some ingenuity The model, which I
know only from Ohanian and Stockman’s
sketch, does not appear to have very attrac-
tive properties with respect to the empirical
observations that motivate Ohanian and






Ohanian and Stockman consider two
models in which asset markets and goods
markets are separated so that household
decisions with respect to holdings ofmoney
and consumption must he made sequentially
The simpler of the two for our purposes is
the one associated with Grossman and Weiss,
and Rotemberg. This model is less easily
rendered in an IS-LM version. Nevertheless,
it isnot difficult to understand its essence.
I think that it is helpful to consider an
even simpler model than Ohanian and
Stockman’s simplification of Grossman and
Weiss’ model, Ilike to think ofthe
Grossman and Weiss model as a kind of
Hindu overlapping-generations model. The
young in the overlapping-generations model
corresponds to Grossman and Weiss’ odd
agents, and the old to their even agents.
Instead of the old dyingas they do in a stan-
dard overlapping-generations model, they
are reincarnated again as young, whfie the
young become old. Unlike Ohanian and
Stockman, or Grossman and Weiss, let us
first consider the model without a cash-in-
advance constraint. That an increase in the
money supply that is disproportionately
received by one of the generations in an
overlapping-generations model results in a
less-than-proportional increase in prices is a
standard result.’ The intuition is simple. If
the young receive an increase, they appear to
have higher wealth at current prices and
wish to consume more, now and in the
future. Iftotal resources are fixed, then
prices rise. This has two effects: It reduces
the real value of the increased money avail-
able to the young, and it reduces the real
value of the money held by the old, reducing
their consumption and freeing up resources
available to the young. Because extra resources
are available to theyoung, the price level need
not rise as far to reduce the real value of the
young’sholdings ofmoney to a sustainable
level. The trick only works because the
resources available to the young can be
extracted from the old through an inflation
tax. As the money becomes more dispersed—
as it must when the young spend some of
it—both young and old come to hold the new
money balances. But sinceinflation can
transfer resources but not create them, even-



















tually prices must rise in direct proportion
to the increased money supply Thus, even
though prices rise less than proportionally this
period, further inflation can be anticipated.
Since money is the only asset in my sim-
plified version of this model, the real rate of
interest isjust the inverse of the rate of infla-
tion, and the nominal rate ofinterest is zero.
The liquidity effect in this model is the fall
in the real rate due to increased inflation.
Ohanian and Stockman’s version of Grossman
and Weiss’ model is able to retain a non-zero
nominal interest rate by imposing acash-in-
advance constraint that applies to two periods
instead ofjust one for those in the asset
market, and to one period for those out of
the asset market. This means that even if
nominal interest rates rise above zero, money
will of necessity still be held.
The Lucas model goes one step further
in collapsing the two types ofagents into a
single household with common budgets and
consumption, but with sequencing of finan-
cialand consumption decisions or differenti-
ated roles for household members. The fun-
damental idea remains similar.
THE PROSPECTS FOR
LIQUiDITY MODELS
The critical question to ask about all of
these models iswhether they really capture
the liquidity effect that we think we see in the
worldor, forthat matter, whether they capture
ourintuitive understanding of the liquidity
effect. I think there is reason to doubt that
they do. I see two related problems.
First, in all of these models—including
even the basic IS-LM model with avertical
LM curve—the liquidity effectseems to
operate through the wrong mechanism, The
modus operandi of the liquidity effect in the
models surveyed by Ohanian and Stockman
is to affect the marginal rates of substitution
between consumption in different periods or
between consumption and leisure. In most
ofthe models, although an interest rate is
determined, interest rates do not matter in
the sense that they are not causally impor-
tant, but rather arepriced as redundant
assets. Thus, for example, the sticky-price
model sets the interest rate according to the
following logic: If there were a bond, it
would have to yield a real rate of interest
equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption today and consump-
tion tomorrow, or it would be dominated in
rate of return by real capital. In the model,
that logic is perfectly correct; it picks out the
correct shadow price. My concern, however,
is precisely that this is a shadow price ofa
shadow asset. Bonds do not do anything
important in the model; they are dispens-
able—a fifth wheel for the economic car.
Yet, normally we think the liquidity effect is
important because mornetary policy affects
interest rates and interest rates are catusally
effective in altering consumption and, more
particularly investment decisions,
These models miss this feature for two
reasons. First, because they are general-
equilibrium models in which all the endoge-
nous variables are determined simultaneous-
ly they cannot adequately model the causal
efficacyof interest rates, Causes operate in
particular directions, and directionality
requires recursive rather than simultaneous
structure. The second reason that these
models miss the causal efficacy ofinterest











rates is that there is no mechanism for inter-
est rates to be determined other than
through the shadow prices associated with
consumption, leisure and saving choices.
The financial sectors in these models are
simply not rich enough. Partly this is a
result of the models assuming representative
agents. Robinson Crusoe does not need a
financial system. The point is not that there
is something wrong in principle with gener-
al-equilibrium models. Rather, it is that a
model of the liquidity effect should have
important financial markets. Models in
which the same equilibria are supported
whether or not bonds are present appear to
miss the crucial point.8
Actually Grossman andWeiss’ model is
not technically arepresentative-agent model
if that is taken to mean asingle-agent model,
but it is close enough to make no difference
for my point. Similarly it is true ofall the
limited-participation models that bonds have
a non-redundant function. Their function,
however, is an artifact ofthe cash-in-advance
constraint, about which I shall have more to
say presently.
It might be useful to compare the under-
scanding of interest rate determination in
this model with that ofJohn Maynard
Keynes in The General Theory.9 Keynes
assumed that the economy was populated
by heterogeneous people with a diversity of
opinions about what normal interest rates
were. At current rates, those who feared
capital losses would hold money (which
for Keynes included Treasury hills and other
short-term, interest-hearing assets) and those
who hoped for capital gains would hold
bonds. The market interest rate was deter-
mined as the point at which those hopes and
fears were balanced. An injection of money
lowered interest rates because a lower rate
increased the proportion ofthe population
who feared capital loss and therefore increased
their willingness to hold the new money
Investors in real capital then looked to the
market rate as part of their piocess ofevalu-
ating the desirability ofanew investment. I
am not arguing that Keynes’ analysis is nec-
essarily correct, but it does seem better than
the representative-agent models at capturing
the spirit of the liquidity effect: The finan-
Nominal Interest Rate
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cial onarket matters fundamentally and inter-
est rates are causally efficacious. Two further
points: Keynes highlights the importance of
the term structure, because he distinguishes
between short (ormoney) rates ofinterest
and long-term rates ofinterest and, at the
same time, he raises the question of what to
count as money
What to countas money raisesthe second
major problem with all of the onodels in
Ohanian and Stockman’s survey: They rely
on the cash-in-advance constraint. Money
therefore, is whatever asset is a direct con-
straint on current expenditure. The cash-in-
advance constraint is, however, a lousy way
to model money mainly because it is not
clear that any asset serves uniquely to hmit
current expenditure. Forvery few purchases
is cash literally necessary in advance ofpur-
chase: Coins in vending machines are one of
the few obvious examples. For any number
of other purchases, cash may he preferred,
forexample, because of lower transactions
costs or anonymity Reflection on the trends
in transactions technology however, suggests
that cash isbecoming less and less essential;
credit cards do for almost everything. And,
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although credit card accounts must be settled,
ultimately through the transfer ofcentral
bank reserves between banks, the settlement
is not in advance hut in arrears. And this is
notjust the trend ofthe future; it is for large
parts ofthe economy the established practice
from ancient times. Businesses operate on
trade credit. My grandparents, who ran a
rural grocery in Georgia, extended credit to
the inhabitants of Chattanooga Valleyand
were paid when their customers became more
liquid. The amusing chapter in Thackery’s
Vanity Fair on “Howto Live on Nothing a Year”
is premised on the practice of 19th-century
English merchants ofextending credit payable
on “quarter days.” A good model ofmoney
is elusive, but the cash-in-advance constraint
is aweak reed on which to build it.
So where does that leave us? Ohanian
and Stockman’s efforts mean that we know a
good deal more about aparticular research
program, hut I am afraid what they have
convinced me is that the particular research
program—representative-agent, cash-in-
advance models—is a dead end and that we
still are a long way from understanding the
liquidity effect.
REFEREHFFS
Chtistiano, Lowrence 1. ‘Modeling the Liquidity Effect of o Money
Shock,’ Federal Reserve lank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review
(winter 1991), pp. 3-34.
ConraIl, AIIm. ‘Keynes and the Keynesians on the Fisher Effect’ working
paper (October 1993), Woke Forest University.
Fisher, Irving. The Theory of Interest, Macmillan, 1930.
ffoover, Kevin 0. The New Classical Macroeconomics: A Sceptical
Inquiry. Blockwell, 1988.
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory ofEmployment Interest and
Money. Macmillan, 1936.
McCallnn, Bennett 1. “The Role of Ooorlepping-Generations Models in
Monetary Economics,’ in Karl Brunner and Allan ff. Meltzem, ads.,
The New Monetary Economics, Fiscal Issues and Unemployment.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 23.
North ffollond, 1983, pp. 13-46,
Mundell, Robert A. Monetary Theory: Inflation and Growth in the World
Economy Goodyear, 1971.
Tobin, James. ‘Money and Economic Growth,’ Econometrico
(October 1965), pp. 671-84.
FEDERAl. RESERVE BANK OF St. LOUIE
32